President Musharraf is feeling the heat following Washington's call for Islamabad to cut ties with the radical Islamic group Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)--responsible for the December hijacking of an Indian Airlines jet--and the Afghan Taliban. The current increase in U.S.-Pakistan tension underscores Washington's impatience with Pakistani links to international terrorists and the pace of democratic reform, highlighting the difficulties faced by the Musharraf regime.

Washington's comments, allegedly aimed at laying out American concerns to Pakistani leaders, raise the specter of U.S. counter-terrorism sanctions against a nuclear-armed and unstable Pakistan. Combined with the mishandling of President Clinton's decision to skip Islamabad during an upcoming tour of the region, American policy has further undermined an already weak Pakistani government.

Links between Pakistani intelligence and groups such as the HUM are, to most experts, indisputable. The HUM, along with groups such as the Harakat ul-Jihad Islami (HUJI) and Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT), have been at the forefront of the Pakistani-based militant opposition to India's control of Kashmir since the early 1990s and have increased ties to international groups such as the Osama bin Laden network. Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to provide sanctuary to UBL. HUM leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil is a signatory to bin Laden's February 1998 anti-U.S. fatwa while Harakat militants were implicated in the fatal 1995 kidnapping of Western tourists in Kashmir. Yet, Pakistan has simultaneously aided American counter-terrorism efforts, including the extradition of suspects involved in the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

U.S. leaders, though rightly angered over Pakistan's transgressions, fail to understand that public diplomacy--much less American-style democracy--is not an appropriate medium for dealing with Islamabad. The military coup does not necessarily mean a return to the days of Zia ul-Haq and almost certainly offers greater hope for Pakistan than the corrupt and power-hungry Sharif administration. The Western-trained Musharraf is a relative "moderate" and may prove able and willing to move against radical elements while enabling a return to civilian rule.

If Musharraf fails, the potential consequences for Pakistan and the region may be great. A further fragmentation of the military, already exacerbated by Musharraf's Mohajir lineage, would see another, possibly more pro-extremist military regime assume power. Increased Pakistani-backed attacks against Indian Kashmir would ensue, enflaming already sensitive Indo-Pakistani tensions in the aftermath of last year's Kargil adventure. U.S. national security demands that policy-makers remain focused on preventing nuclear conflict on the sub-continent and Pakistan's devolution into a rogue state. America cannot afford to see the Afghanization of a nuclear-capable Pakistan.

The linkages between reduced extremism, economic assistance and political reform require American application of financial levers in addition to long-term, stability-driven diplomacy. In turn, Musharraf must reorient himself toward the reformation of the political landscape, creating viable alternatives to the endemic corruption and inefficiency characteristic of past civilian governments. Regardless of U.S. efforts, the potential for Musharraf's failure will remain. The absence of American leadership and creative diplomacy, however, will likely ensure failure and sow the seeds for further destabilization of this vital region.

John Moore can be reached at jdmoore_1@hotmail.com

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