Fighting with Nonviolence: A Workshop with Gene Sharp

by Thomas Lank ('02) and Maria J. Stephan ('02)

Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz regarded the true test of good strategy as its ability to achieve the political object without the use of military force.  The second session of the 2001-02 Fletcher Colloquium on Strategic Nonviolent Action brought 50 students from Harvard, Tufts, and Fletcher to ASEAN auditorium for a full-day workshop on the "weapons" of strategic non-violence. The honored guest and workshop leader was Dr. Gene Sharp, Director of the Albert Einstein Institute and author of a number of books on nonviolent struggle, including a three-volume compendium entitled The Politics of Nonviolent Action.  Dr. Sharp, a renowned pioneer in the field of applied nonviolence, divided the workshop into four sessions: "Power and the Workings of Nonviolent Struggle", "Wise Action and Strategic Planning", "From Powerlessness to Empowerment" and "Applications of an Alternative to Violence".  Each of the sessions was followed by an intense question and answer period, with Fletcher students and others posing tough (and sometimes unanswerable) questions about the use of nonviolent action today. 

"Nonviolence is a way of fighting!" Dr. Sharp began the workshop by defining nonviolent struggle as "armed struggle using nonviolent weapons" - psychological, social, political, and economic. He distinguished between "principled nonviolence" (nonviolence as a way of life) and "practical nonviolence" (nonviolence as a technique of active resistance) and insisted that most nonviolent activists are not pacifists.  Symbolic actions, non-cooperation, and disruptive intervention are forms of nonviolent action that have been used creatively by groups of nonviolent actionists at different times in history to topple dictatorships and transform situations of profound injustice.

Sharp cited the example of the Baltic states, small countries under Soviet occupation whose citizens used active nonviolent resistance to win independence. In Serbia, the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic was achieved not by NATO bombing but by an effective nonviolent campaign led by Serb youths trained in nonviolent action - the NATO bombing, according to Sharp and the Serb youths he interviewed, only allowed Milosevic to stay in power for a longer period of time. 

Thinking about nonviolent action strategically is a relatively new phenomenon. However, as Sharp pointed out, planning nonviolent action in advance could significantly aid nonviolent campaigns in the future.  When planning a nonviolent strategy, nonviolent actionists should first identify the sources of the opponent's power ("pillars of strength") and then think about ways to dismantle these power sources. Sharp identified six main "pillars" of a regime's support:

1. Authority.  The extent and intensity of the rulers' authority or legitimacy among the subjects.

2. Human resources.  The number of persons who obey, cooperate, or provide special assistance, their proportion in the population, and the extent and forms of their organizations.

3. Skills and knowledge.  The skills, knowledge, and abilities of such persons, and their capacity to supply the needs of the ruler.

4. Intangible factors. Psychological and ideological factors, such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission.

5. Material resources.  Property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication, and transportation.

6. Sanctions.  The type and extent of pressures and punishments available for rulers to use against their own subjects and in conflicts with other rulers.[1]

Highly repressive regimes are often the most vulnerable because they try to control more than they possibly can.  These regimes are especially vulnerable to nonviolent action that uses nonviolent tactics to undermine their legitimacy and remove their sources of power. Whereas military strategies target the opponent's strength (military capability), nonmilitary strategies target the opponent's sources of power.  This strategic choice, says Sharp, makes nonviolent war more direct, and efficient, than military combat. Following a strategic evaluation of the opponent's weaknesses and the nonviolent group's strengths, a non-violent struggle will attempt to do six things:

1. Strengthen the oppressed population by building confidence, self-reliance, and skills of resistance
2. Build institutions and organizing channels to conduct the resistance
3. Create a powerful internal resistance force.
4. Exploit the weaknesses and problems of the oppressor
5. Develop a wise grand strategic plan
6. Remove the pillars of support of the target.

To be effective, nonviolent struggles must remain nonviolent and nonviolent discipline must be maintained.  Turning to violence in response to violent repression will only give the opponent the "green light" to use even more force; meanwhile, the nonviolent actors lose the moral high ground (and the sympathy of the international community). This has been the case in the Israeli-Palestinian, Sri Lankan, and Russo-Chechen conflicts.  Remaining nonviolent, however, requires incredible discipline and bravery.  Fear, as Sharp pointed out, is often the greatest barrier to the successful prosecution of nonviolent struggle.  Therefore, the leaders of nonviolent movements, who need not be highly-charismatic like Gandhi or King, must strive to keep morale high. Small victories are needed to boost the morale of the nonviolent soldiers, who might otherwise reject nonviolence in favor of violence. That is why, according to Dr. Sharp, it is essential that nonviolent campaigns start small and build momentum.  Focusing on smaller issues (like the recognition of trade unions in Communist Poland or executing a successful consumer boycott in South Africa) boosts the confidence of the participants and expand the ranks of supporters.  Attempting to do everything at once (ie ending a war or overthrowing a regime) is a recipe for failure. An effective grand strategy, said Sharp, will be able to distinguish between winning a battle and winning a war. Grand strategy, smaller campaign strategies, tactics and nonviolent techniques are all part of every successful nonviolent struggle.

While most of Sharp's research has focused on nonviolent action vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes, his principles have a much wider applicability.  Fletcher students challenged Dr. Sharp by  attempting to apply his model the so-called "anti-globalization" movement, to protracted ethno-political struggles, and to the struggle against a nebulous transnational network of terrorists.  Can non-violence be used effectively against such opponents? Is it possible for a violent movement to transform into a nonviolent one? If so, how? 

Although Sharp conceded that there is no way to use nonviolent tactics to prevent hi-jacked planes from crashing into buildings, he suggested that we try to understand the terrorists' mind-sets and assumptions in order to prepare a long term strategy for dealing with this threat. Terrorist acts like those of September 11th are considered by the terrorists to be miniscule compared to the lethal power wielded by the United States, a country capable of killing tens of thousands by dropping a single bomb. Bin Laden understood that the greatest "pillar of strength"  in the U.S. was not its tanks or fighter jets but, rather, its civilian population.  That was his target of choice. Sharp suggested that if the United States and its allies pursue a military strategy that results in a burgeoning of the global terrorist network, then the terrorists emerge victorious. 

Dr. Gene Sharp's presentations were provocative and highly engaging.  By the end of the day-long workshop, the audience was asking pointed questions about the practical application and strategic implications of nonviolence.  Although it might be difficult to consider nonmilitary alternatives today, Sharp encouraged us all to learn from the incredible past successes of "people power" movements and think about ways to make nonviolence a more powerful force today.  Indeed, developing creative nonmilitary strategies might be more important today than ever before.

Note: The third session of the Fletcher Colloquium on Strategic Nonviolent Action, entitled "The Interplay Between Violence and Nonviolence in Indigenous Nonviolent Struggles" will take place on WEDNESDAY,  NOVEMBER 14^th from 5:00-6:30 in Cabot 206. The featured speakers will be Aung Thu Nein (Burma) and Yasin Malik (Kashmir). Reception will follow.

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